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DEMAND AND RISK MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS OF   
RAINFALL INDEX INSURANCE 
Ashlee Carlson, M.S. 
University of Nebraska, 2017 
Advisors: Kathleen Brooks and Cory Walters 
This thesis has two research chapters regarding the government provided Rainfall 
Index Insurance for Pasture, Rangeland, and Forage (RI-PRF).  In the first chapter, we 
empirically examined whether charity hazard exists between Rainfall Index Insurance 
(RI-PRF) and government mandated Livestock Forage Program by estimating the 
demand for RI-PRF.  Evidence was found that lagged LFP payments significantly 
increase the marginal effects of participating in RI-PRF in three of the five states and in 
the combined model.  These results support the opposite of charity hazard where LFP 
payments improve the probability of purchasing RI-PRF.  In our other models, the results 
provide evidence in support and against charity hazard in RI-PRF participation.  As a 
result, we cannot definitively accept or reject our hypothesis that charity hazard exists in 
RI-PRF participation. 
 In the second chapter, we examined the relation between RI-PRF insurance 
interval selection and financial outcomes from forage production for two locations in the 
Sandhills of Nebraska.  We find that the risk reducing effectiveness of the monthly 
insurance interval depends upon expected precipitation.  Our results indicate that 
insurance scenarios containing monthly intervals with high expected precipitation (during 
the growing season) reduced producer risk.  Whereas insurance scenarios containing 
monthly intervals with low expected precipitation (non-growing season) did not result in 
 
 
reducing producer risk.  In addition, insurance intervals with low expected precipitation 
offered the highest net returns to insurance participation at one location, had higher 
premiums and therefore, higher government cost through additional subsidy dollars per 
acre. 
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Chapter 1: Role of Charity Hazard on the Adoption of Government Provided Index 
Insurance  
 
Introduction 
The Risk Management Agency (RMA) established Pasture, Rangeland and 
Forage Insurance (PRF) in 2007 as a pilot program providing livestock producers 
insurance for their loss of grazing or hay land dependent on either a rainfall index (RI) or 
vegetation index (VI).  In 2016, RI-PRF replaced VI-PRF for all 48 contiguous states.  In 
the 2014 Farm Bill, the government additionally provided mandated livestock disaster 
assistance programs to help manage feed losses.  The Livestock Forage Program (LFP) 
provides feed assistance payments due to effects of drought or wildfire on grazing lands.   
Currently, producers have the option of managing production risk through a fully 
subsidized government mandated disaster assistance program based on ex-post weather 
conditions as well as through a partially subsidized ex-ante RI-PRF insurance program.  
If the producers have incentive to under insure against losses due to adverse weather 
events, producers may substitute mandated disaster program participation for RI-PRF 
participation.  If the substitution is present because of anticipation of the government 
assistance, it is considered charity hazard (Coate 1995).  In this paper we empirically 
examine whether charity hazard exists between RI-PRF and LFP programs. 
RI-PRF and disaster programs, while similar in that they provide financial 
assistance to producers stemming from similar events, they provide assistance in 
fundamentally different ways.  First, disaster assistance programs calculate payments 
based on ex-post disaster conditions taking into account multiple conditions that may 
contribute to drought such as heat and precipitation.  RI-PRF insures against upcoming 
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production uncertainty insuring only a single peril, precipitation.  Second, government 
mandated disaster assistance is 100% subsidized (zero producer paid premium), 
compared to RI-PRF which is subsidized between 51-59% based upon coverage level.1  
RI-PRF allows producers to choose their contract specificity and with the ability of 
choice, they are subject to pay higher premiums.  Finally, RI-PRF is insuring 
precipitation based on a rainfall index from a 17-mile by 17-mile grid, while LFP is based 
on the entire counties drought classification.  Disaster payments are affected by county 
size since the drought index is based on county level.  County size and location can cause 
regional differences in disaster assistance payments and size of payments for producers.   
In 2012, the United States experienced its worst drought in more than 50 years 
causing adverse events.   For example, corn and soybean harvests began earlier than ever 
recorded, affecting livestock production and global food prices.  Hay prices were at 
record levels and the drought depleted water supplies.  For perennial grazing/haying 
systems, drought caused weed species to expand and decreased perennial abundance.  
During that year, 59% of the U.S. rangeland and pastures were in poor to very poor 
condition (USDA-NASS 2012).   In response to poor perennial conditions and high feed 
costs, producers were forced to change their management practices.  Most cow-calf 
producers thinned out their herds by selling to feedlots earlier than expected or culling 
(Kay 2012).  These practices were used to help minimize their losses.  LFP and RI-PRF 
were available during the drought, however, they both had their disadvantages for this 
catastrophic event.  Producers had to sign up for RI-PRF in November 2011 for 2012.  
                                                          
1 To sign up for LFP, the producer must go to their FSA office and sign up for the program.  This could be 
considered a cost, but the producer paid premium is zero.  
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RI-PRF was also not available in all states.2  On the other hand, LFP was not offered until 
2014 and distributed back payments for 2012 and 2013.  However, producers did have 
knowledge about LFP coming into effect from the 2008 Farm Bill and the proposed 2012 
Farm Bill, which discussed mandated disaster assistance for livestock producers.  
RI-PRF and VI-PRF together sold 22,130 total policies resulting in $185.73 
million of indemnities paid out in 2012 (USDA-RMA 2012).  LFP provided $2579.35 
million for 287,426 policies for 2012 (USDA-FSA 2014).  For 2016, RI-PRF enrolled 
28,538 policies providing coverage on more than 52.3 million acres (USDA-RMA 
2017b).  The insured acreage represents only about 8% of the total 649.5 million acres of 
pasture and hay land (USDA-NASS 2017).  With the small percentage of acres enrolled 
in RI-PRF, it brings the question if other insurance mechanisms are affecting demand for 
the insurance product.  Since both RI-PRF and LFP are provided by U.S. tax dollars, it is 
important to evaluate purchasing decisions by producers to insure in the programs.   
This article proceeds as follows.  We first provide a review of literature regarding 
demand for insurance based on government assistance.  We describe RI-PRF insurance 
program followed by a description of the LFP disaster assistance program.  We then 
introduce the conceptual model with a description of the data, methods and empirical 
analysis.  Findings are presented and interpreted in the results section, with conclusions 
in the last section.  
 
 
                                                          
2 Not all states were introduced into the RI-PRF pilot program. Most western states were in the VI-PRF 
pilot program.  Visit the RMA website for maps of availability. 
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Literature Review 
Literature contributes to this evaluation of the demand of insurance with the 
presence of disaster assistance.  Raschky et al. (2013) presents an extensive literature 
review comparing crowd out effects of private insurance due to the presence of ad hoc 
and disaster assistance.  Raschky et al. (2013) examined charity hazard for flood 
insurance, however, their review provides great depth into the literature discussing 
government assistance programs.   
Literature found that the primary demand for crop insurance is driven by expected 
indemnities in excess of premiums and varying risk preferences (Goodwin 1993; Barnett 
and Skees 1995; Just, Calvin, and Quiggin 1999; Babcock 2012).  Through conducted 
phone interviews, van Asseldonk et al. (2002) found Netherlands’ producers’ anticipated 
disaster assistance does have an effect on the producer’s willingness to pay for crop 
insurance.  This links directly to our analysis of the impact of LFP on demand for RI-PRF 
insurance.  Government relief distorts incentives for producers to pay premiums since the 
producers do not bear the full cost of their actions (Kaplow 1991).   Although a working 
paper, Deryugina and Kirwan (2016) finds producer’s crop insurance expenditures 
decrease as expected disaster payments increase.   
Most literature about disaster assistance has political determinants for the 
allocation of disaster assistance, however, the allocation of LFP is mandated through the 
2014 Farm Bill (Michel-Kerjan and Kousky 2010; Weber, Key, and O ’Donoghue 2016).   
Mandated disaster assistance provides a clear set of eligibility requirements to receive 
payments.  Producer payments are directly contingent on the weather conditions for their 
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counties.  From the clear set of eligibility and payment requirements, it makes political 
interference less likely than ad hoc disaster assistance.  
  
VI-PRF Program 
 VI-PRF represents an area insurance plan based on Earth Resources Observation 
Systems (EROS) Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) data, using a 4.8-mile 
square grid.  VI-PRF insures eligible acreage for livestock grazing or haying.  Producers 
can select one or more three-month insurance intervals in which NDVI data is important 
for their forage production (USDA-RMA 2017a).  Insurance payments to the producer 
are calculated based on deviation from the normal NDVI within the grid and index 
interval selection.  When the grid’s accumulated index falls below a “trigger grid index”, 
insured producers may be indemnified.  
Coverage levels are chosen from 70%-90% in 5% increments varying by county 
and production type.  Productivity factors vary from 60% to 150% of county base value 
in 1% increments.  The 70% and 75% coverage levels are subsidized at 59% of the 
premium.  For coverage levels of 80% and 85%, 55% of the premium is subsidized.  
Lastly, for 90% coverage level, 51% of the premium is subsidized. 
 
RI-PRF Program 
RI-PRF represents a single peril index insurance product focusing on the 
production of perennial forages on rangeland, pastureland, and cropland.  The objective 
of RI-PRF is to provide perennial forage producers revenue due to losses in precipitation 
(USDA-RMA 2017a).  To be eligible for RI-PRF, the producer is required to have a 
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share on insurable acreage that was in production before July 1 prior to the coverage year.  
RI-PRF offers a variety of contracts based on varying coverage levels and productivity 
factors.  Coverage levels are chosen from 70%-90% in 5% increments varying by county 
and production type.  Productivity factors vary from 60% to 150% of county base value 
in 1% increments.  
RI-PRF insures by grids created by the National Oceanic Atmospheric 
Administration Climate Prediction Center and do not follow geopolitical boundaries.  The 
gridded precipitation data represents an interpolated value based on the entire grid and 
cannot be traced to a single point or reporting station.  RI-PRF requires the producer to 
insure monthly precipitation using two-month intervals. RI-PRF is available for the entire 
calendar year and not only during the grazing or haying season.  Losses are calculated 
based on whether the current year’s precipitation in a grid has deviated from the historical 
normal precipitation in the same grid, for the same interval.  The 70% and 75% coverage 
levels are subsidized at 59% of the premium.  For coverage levels of 80% and 85%, 55% 
of the premium is subsidized.  Lastly, for 90% coverage level, 51% of the premium is 
subsidized.  
 
Livestock Forage Program 
 LFP is a disaster assistance program to compensate livestock producers who have 
suffered grazing losses for covered livestock on land that is native or improved 
pastureland with permanent vegetative cover or is planted specifically for grazing 
(USDA-FSA 2017).  The grazing losses must be due to a qualifying drought condition 
during the normal grazing period for the county.  An eligible livestock producer would be 
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a producer who owns or leases grazing land or pastureland physically located in a county 
where the U.S. Drought Monitor declared the county to be within D2-D4 drought 
intensities (USDA-FSA 2017).   
 D2 intensity is defined as a severe drought where the crop or pasture losses are 
likely, water shortages common, and water restrictions imposed (USDM 2017).  If any 
area of the county is in D2 for at least eight consecutive weeks during the normal grazing 
period, the county is eligible to receive assistance in an amount equal to one monthly 
payment (USDA-FSA 2017). 
 D3 intensity is defined as an extreme drought where crop and pasture losses 
would be major, widespread water shortages and restrictions (USDM 2017).  If any area 
of the county is in D3 at any time during the normal grazing period, the county is eligible 
to receive assistance in an amount equal to three monthly payments.  If any area in the 
county has a D3 drought for at least four weeks during the normal grazing period, the 
county is eligible to receive assistance in amount equal to four monthly payments 
(USDA-FSA 2017).  
 D4 intensity is defined as an exceptional drought to which there are exceptional 
and widespread crop/pasture losses, shortage of water in reservoirs, steams and wells 
creating water emergencies (USDM 2017).  If any area of the county is in a D4 during the 
normal grazing period, the county is eligible to receive assistance in amount equal to four 
monthly payments.  If there is D4 in a county for four weeks during the normal grazing 
period, the county is eligible to receive assistance in amount equal to five monthly 
payments (USDA-FSA 2017). 
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 FSA created the LFP payment rate for drought which is equal to 60 percent of the 
lesser of either the monthly feed cost for all covered livestock owned or leased by an 
eligible livestock producer or calculated by using the normal carrying capacity of the 
eligible grazing land of the eligible livestock producer (USDA-FSA 2017).  Total LFP 
payments to an eligible livestock producer in a calendar year for grazing losses does not 
exceed five monthly payments for the same livestock.  If an eligible livestock producer 
sold or otherwise disposed of livestock because of drought conditions in one or both of 
the two previous production years immediately preceding the current production year, the 
payment rate will equal 80 percent of the monthly payment rate.  No one person or legal 
entity may receive more than $125,000 total in payments in all disaster assistance 
programs combined (USDA-FSA 2017).3  To sign up for the program, the eligible 
livestock producer must go to their local FSA office within 30 days of qualifying drought 
conditions to fill out paperwork.  
 
Conceptual Model 
Following Raschky and Weck-Hannenman (2007), we assume counties are utility 
maximizers that obtain an amount of insurance coverage 𝑉(𝛼) to insure against a 
potential loss 𝐿(𝛼), where 𝛼 is the insurable acres.  Figure 1, shows two types of states of 
the world.  State 1 (𝑆1) is assumed to be a year without any adverse weather events.  State 
2 (𝑆2) is subjected to an adverse weather event.  Counties in 𝑆2  are trying to determine 
the level of insurance coverage to have the same wealth as in 𝑆1.  It is assumed that 
                                                          
3 These disaster assistant programs include Livestock Indemnity Program (LIP) and Emergency Assistance 
for Livestock, Farm Raised Fish and Honeybees (ELAP).  
9 
 
 
 
insurance is set as an actuarially fair premium, 𝑃(𝛼).  Each county is allocated an initial 
wealth of 𝑊0. Government provided disaster assistance can be paid through different 
amounts depending on the severity of the weather event where  𝜃1 < 𝜃2 < 𝜃3.  As theory 
suggests, the largest government provided disaster payment (𝐺3) will keep counties from 
enrolling in the insurance because counties are able to move to a higher indifference 
curve (𝐼2).  For the small level of government provided disaster assistance (𝐺1), counties 
will cover at point 𝐶 (the highest coverage level) to insure their potential loss.  For the 
medium level of government provided disaster assistance (𝐺2), counties are indifferent 
between point 𝐶 and 𝐷 since both are on the same indifference curve (𝐼1).  Counties 
chose their coverage depending on their expected government provided assistance.  This 
idea that counties base their decisions on whether or not to buy insurance or underinsure 
based on anticipated government assistance motivated the empirical analysis shown in 
the following section.  
 
Data and Methods 
The current research uses a detailed RI-PRF and VI-PRF data set provided by the 
Risk Management Agency.  RMA provides historical information for their programs on 
their website (USDA-RMA 2017c).   Data were collected for all counties in the top five 
cow-calf producing states.  The top five cow-calf states in 2017 were Texas, Nebraska, 
California, Oklahoma, and Kansas (LMIC 2017).  For each county, detailed policy 
information was provided for the years 2012-2016, including number of acres enrolled, 
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premiums paid, liability per acre, indemnity, coverage level, subsidy.4  For RI-PRF acres 
enrolled, the return from insurance per acre was calculated as enrolled indemnities minus 
premiums paid.  
LFP data were obtained from the Farm Service Agency through a freedom of 
information act acquisition.  Data provided historical LFP payments by year by county 
within those five states along with the number of requested payments.  We assume that it 
costs the producer zero dollars to sign up for LFP payments.  Therefore, we calculate 
LFP payment per acre by taking the payment over the total county pastureland acres 
(USDA-NASS 2017a).  County level data was analyzed because farm level data for 
insurance policies and disaster assistance payments cannot be used for confidentiality 
purposes.  Median household income for each county was found on County Health 
Rankings (2017). 
Following Browne and Hoyt (2000), the current research uses an empirical 
analysis to determine the interrelationships of ex-ante insurance (RI-PRF) with ex-post 
insurance (LFP) to determine impacts on producers’ risk management decisions.  RI-PRF 
and LFP both cover feed losses for livestock, therefore will be used for analysis. 
(1)               𝑌𝑐𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛾𝑐 + 𝛿𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘
4
𝑘=1 𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑐𝑡−1 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑖+4
4
𝑖=1 𝑅𝐼𝐴𝑐𝑡−1 +
𝛽9log (𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑐𝑡) + 𝛽10 log(𝑊𝑐𝑡) + 𝜖𝑐𝑡       
Where 𝑌𝑐𝑡 is the dependent variable in county  𝑐  for year 𝑡 ; 𝛼 is the constant; 
𝛾𝑐 is the year indicator; 𝛿𝑡 is the county fixed affect; 𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑐𝑡−1 is Livestock Forage 
Disaster Payment per acre from the previous year; 𝑅𝐼𝐴𝑐𝑡−1 is the return from PRF 
                                                          
4 Nebraska was the only state enrolled in VI-PRF during our analysis and only for Year 2012.  
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insurance per acre from the previous year;  log (𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑐𝑡) is the log of premium paid per 
acre;  log(𝑊𝑐𝑡) is the log of wealth; and 𝜖𝑐𝑡 is the error term. Two dependent variables 
were used to measure the demand for RI-PRF insurance.  The first variable (model 1), 
𝑅𝐼𝑃𝑅𝐹𝑐𝑡, is the percent of acres enrolled in RI-PRF. The second variable (model 2), 
𝑅𝐼𝐿𝐼𝐴𝑐𝑡, is the amount of liability.  
We build upon Raschky and Weck-Hanneman (2007) by breaking out the impact 
of different sizes of disaster assistance (LFP) payments to evaluate their marginal effects 
on RI-PRF. 𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑐𝑡−1 payments were calculated per acre by taking the county LFP 
payment divided by the amount of pastureland acres in the county.  Since the whole 
county is able to receive payments if any part of the county is in the drought zone, we are 
able to assume that every acre in the county received some of the payment.  Pastureland 
acres were assumed to be constant from 2012-2016.  𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑐𝑡−1 is used for the hypothesis 
that the larger the payment from a fully subsidized insurance program (disaster 
assistance) negatively affect the enrollment into a premium required insurance program 
based on rainfall indices and intervals. Disaster payments, ∑ 𝛽𝑘
4
𝑘=1 𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑐𝑡−1were divided 
into four categorical bins; Zero LFP payment, Small LFP payment, Medium LFP 
payment, and Large LFP payment.  Zero LFP payment was created for all counties in 
which no LFP payments were made in a given year. For counties within a given year that 
received an LFP payment, bins were created using quartiles where the top 25% of the 
payments were classified as large LFP payments, bottom 25% as small LFP payments, 
and the middle 50% were grouped as medium LFP payments.  Table 1 reports LFP 
payments per acre summary statistics for the combined and individual state models along 
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with the mean of each bin.  We created different LFP bins for each individual state in 
order to show regional effects. 
To determine if the past returns from insurance affected the enrollment in the 
current year’s insurance program, we lagged returns from insurance (𝑅𝐼𝐴𝑐𝑡−1).  The RIA 
is per acre where the county return was divided by the total acres enrolled in the program.  
RIA was separated into four different categories in order to determine if the magnitude or 
sign of the lagged return affected current percent of acres enrolled and/or the liability per 
acre in RI-PRF.  The bins are categorized as negative returns, between returns, positive 
returns, and no acres enrolled in the program.  Negative returns mean the producer paid 
more into premiums than received in indemnities.  Positive returns mean the producer 
received more in indemnities than paid in premiums.  The no acres enrolled category was 
created for any county in which no acres were enrolled in a PRF program in a given year.  
For counties in which acres were enrolled in PRF in a given year were distributed into 
bins based on the return using quantiles.  The lowest 25% of returns were classified into 
the negative return bin since the mean for that bin is negative for the combined and each 
individual state.  In the second bin, we grouped the middle 50% into a bin as the between 
returns.  Lastly, our positive returns are the largest 25% of the returns.  With the bins, we 
are able to capture the effect of large positive and large negative returns on demand. 
Summary statistics for the RI-PRF returns for the combined model as well as all the 
states is reported in Table 2.   
Premiums paid per acre per county was logged for our regression (log (𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑐𝑡)). 
The RMA data contained premiums paid, which were then divided by acres enrolled in 
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the insurance to create the premiums paid per acre by county.  No premium prices were 
given for counties who did not participate in the program in a given year, therefore, 
premiums for those counties were set as the average of the state premium paid in the 
program in a given year.  Even though counties did not participate in RI-PRF, they are 
still faced with premium prices.  
RI-PRF premiums and deciding whether to enroll acres into RI-PRF or how much 
liability to purchase are jointly determined and can cause endogeneity.  Using the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test we found endogeneity in some of the models.  Out of 18 tests (6 
models (5 states and one combined) with 3 dependent variables) 11 were statistically 
significant.  We instrumented RI-PRF premium using lagged RI-PRF premium, lagged 
wealth, and year indicators.   
RMA recently released RI-PRF, therefore many counties did not have any 
enrollment, causing a large number of observations at zero.  A selection model was first 
estimated to focus on the probability of purchasing RI-PRF.  For the selection model, the 
dependent variable of whether or not a county enrolled in RI-PRF in a given year was 
represented with a 1 if a positive number of acres in a county in a given year were 
enrolled in RI-PRF.  Marginal effects are then calculated for the selection model in order 
to interpret the coefficients.  From the selection model, data was removed where there 
was zero acres enrolled in insurance for our percentage of RI-PRF acres enrolled model 
and amount of liability enrolled model.     
Equation (1) was estimated for each state along with one combined state model.  
For the combined state a state fixed effect was used instead of the county fixed effect 
because the counties in zero were perfectly predicting the selection model.  Both the 
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selection model and regression models have the same explanatory variables from 
equation (1).      
 
Results 
Table 3 reports the marginal effects from the selection model for the combined 
model (all states) and the individual state models.5  The constant in the combined model 
represents California in 2013, zero LFP payments and not enrolled in RI-PRF the 
previous year.6  For the state models the constant represents zero LFP payments and not 
enrolled in RI-PRF the previous year. Log of premium was significant and positive in 
three states- Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas.  This result is counter intuitive because one 
would expect premium to be negatively related to participation.  A likely reason for this 
result is due to the fact that premiums vary substantially upon the insured months and the 
productivity factor.  As a result, it may be possible that participants are selecting to insure 
in the months with the higher premiums, possibly at higher productivity factors.  The log 
of wealth was found to be significant with differing signs in the selection model in two 
states: California (negative) and Oklahoma (positive).  We found negative significant 
results for the year indicator in all models but two states – Kansas and Texas.  Year 
indicator 2014 was significant and negative for the combined, Nebraska, and Oklahoma.  
Since the drought occurred mostly in 2012, year indicator 2014 suggests that counties are 
less likely to enroll in RI-PRF compared to 2013.  For 2013, counties were experiencing 
a drought during signup period, so they would be more likely to purchase insurance. Year 
                                                          
5 Parameter estimates can be made available by contacting the authors. 
6 State fixed effects were not included in Table 3 but available upon request.   
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indicator 2016 was significant and negative for combined, California, and Oklahoma.  A 
result suggesting as counties move further away from the drought year, they are less 
likely to purchase RI-PRF.    
For lagged LFP payments, we found at least one significant and negative response 
in only one state, California for small LFP payment. This result suggests that charity 
hazard exists in livestock insurance.  However, we did not find a similar result with 
medium and large LFP payments in California.  A result suggesting our finding of charity 
hazard is not very strong.  We did find evidence that lagged LFP payments significantly 
increase the marginal effects of participating in RI-PRF in three of the five states and in 
the combined model.  These results support the opposite of charity hazard - LFP 
payments improve the probability of RI-PRF participation.  A possible reason for this 
may be that producers are more informed about risks and government programs by 
participating in LFP.  Nebraska was the only state without a significant response to 
lagged LFP payments.    
 We found statistically significant and positive impacts of lagged RI-PRF returns 
on RI-PRF participation for all models and all bins.  A result indicating that counties 
previously enrolled in RI-PRF are more likely to continue to participate in RI-PRF then 
counties who did not previously enroll even if they had received a negative return.  Our 
results show knowledge of RI-PRF contributes to participation into RI-PRF.   
Table 4 reports the results of model 1 where the dependent variable is the percent 
of acres enrolled in RI-PRF.  In this model, we only use counties with acres enrolled in 
RI-PRF for the current year.  The constant represents a county in 2013 with zero LFP 
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payments and not enrolled in RI-PRF the previous year.7  Log of premium was 
significant in combined and three states- Nebraska, Oklahoma and Texas.  The 
significance all differ in signs: combined (negative), Nebraska (negative), Oklahoma 
(positive), and Texas (negative).  Negative and significant coefficients for log of 
premiums would follow neoclassical demand where the price increases, the quantity 
demanded decreases.  Positive and significant coefficient could present the case of 
counties changing their participation into higher premium generating intervals and/or 
productivity factors.  The log of wealth was found to be significant with differing signs in 
the selection model in two states: California (negative) and Oklahoma (positive).  We 
found negative significant results for the year indicator in all models but two states – 
Kansas and Texas.  Year indicator 2014 was found to be significant for the combined and 
all but one state - Oklahoma.  Year indicator 2014 had differing signs where California 
was positive and the other significant models (combined, Kansas, Nebraska, and Texas) 
were negative.  Year indicator 2015 was significant and differed in signs for two states: 
California (positive) and Nebraska (negative).  Year indicator 2016 was significant and 
negative for two states: Oklahoma and Texas.   
We found lagged LFP payments negative and significant in two states – 
California and Oklahoma.  A result suggesting the presence of charity hazard in both 
California and Oklahoma.  However, only Oklahoma had results consistent across bins, 
in that larger LFP payments were significantly and negatively influencing the probability 
of enrolling acres in RI-PRF.   This result follows the conceptual model of charity hazard 
                                                          
7 County fixed effects are not presented in the table, but available upon request. 
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in Figure 1.  We also found evidence against charity hazard.  For both the combined 
model and Texas, small, medium, and large lagged LFP payments increased the percent 
of acres enrolled in RI-PRF.  No effect was found in Kansas and Nebraska.  Our results 
provide evidence in support and against charity hazard in RI-PRF participation.  As a 
result, we cannot definitively accept or reject our hypothesis that charity hazard exists in 
RI-PRF participation.    
Lagged RI-PRF returns were found to be significant and negative in the combined 
model and Nebraska for the negative and between bins.  A result suggesting that if the 
returns are not positive or large, the county is averse to enrolling.  
 Table 5 reports the results of model 2 where the dependent variable is liability per 
acre.  Just like in model 1, we only consider counties with positive liability.  The constant 
represents a county in 2013 with zero LFP payments and not enrolled in RI-PRF the 
previous year.8  Year indicator 2014 was significant and positive for combined and three 
states- Kansas, Nebraska, and Texas.  Year indicator 2015 was significant and positive 
for one state- Kansas. Year indicator 2016 was significant and negative for the combined 
and one state- Texas.  We found significant and negative lagged LFP payments in Texas.  
Additionally, parameter estimates grew as the lagged LFP payment grew.  As a result, 
Texas provides evidence of charity hazard.  We also found the opposite of charity hazard 
in Oklahoma for all three bins and for one bin in Kansas (large lagged LFP).     Results 
do not provide widespread support of charity hazard in lagged LFP payments on the 
amount of RI-PRF liability purchased.   
                                                          
8 County fixed effects are not presented in the table, but available upon request. 
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Lagged RI-PRF returns are significant and negative for the between return bin in 
only one state- Oklahoma.   Log of premium was significant and positive in combined 
and two states- Nebraska and Texas.  Log of wealth is significant and negative in only 
one state- Oklahoma.  A result suggesting decreasing risk aversion.   
 
Conclusions 
We empirically examined whether charity hazard exists between RI-PRF and LFP 
programs by estimating the demand for RI-PRF.  A selection model was first estimated to 
focus on the probability of purchasing RI-PRF.  Next, we used two dependent variables 
to measure the demand for RI-PRF insurance.  The first variable (model 1), 𝑅𝐼𝑃𝑅𝐹𝑐𝑡, is 
the percent of acres enrolled in RI-PRF. The second variable (model 2), 𝑅𝐼𝐿𝐼𝐴𝑐𝑡, is the 
amount of liability. 
 We did find evidence that lagged LFP payments significantly increase the 
marginal effects of participating in RI-PRF in three of the five states and in the combined 
model.  These results support the opposite of charity hazard where LFP payments 
improve the probability of purchasing RI-PRF.  In our other models, the results provide 
evidence in support and against charity hazard in RI-PRF participation.  As a result, we 
cannot definitively accept or reject our hypothesis that charity hazard exists in RI-PRF 
participation.   
We can also conclude that being enrolled in RI-PRF previously increases the 
likelihood of enrolling into the insurance in the future.  Based on our selection model, 
counties who have been previously enrolled would continue enrolling compared to 
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counties who have not enrolled at all.  Premiums also show to have a positive and 
significant effect on the selection into RI-PRF insurance.  Since RI-PRF gives the ability 
to select their own intervals for insurance, counties might be moving from growing 
season intervals with lower premium rates to winter months with higher premium rates.  
These increase the premiums paid, but the county is insuring for the whole year.  
Mandated disaster assistance only insures for the growing season, so the producer has an 
added protection for their growing season.    
For further research, we would like to evaluate the actual returns from both 
programs to evaluate expected utility as a function of profit.  Additionally, producer level 
data is needed for the analysis to reflect actual producer behavior.  Data from farm-level 
producers, would also allow for evaluation of whether the government resources are 
being used efficiently and effectively.  We would benefit from interval selections from 
producers and how those have changed from the introduction of LFP.   
 Another extension of this research could be to involve all livestock insurance 
programs as a whole.  Since RI-PRF and LFP reflect insurance for feed costs for 
livestock producers, they are the most relatable programs.   
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 1: Livestock Forage Disaster Program (LFP) Payment Statistics, $ per acre 
Bins Statistic Combined California Kansas Nebraska Oklahoma Texas 
Overall Mean $11.08 $4.30 $17.11 $22.19 $21.61 $4.87 
 Min $0.001 $0.04 $0.001 $0.02 $0.003 $0.002 
 Max $131.47 $42.09 $79.72 $131.47 $103.30 $40.84 
Small Mean $0.97 $0.83 $1.80 $3.36 $5.68 $0.84 
 Min $0.001 $0.04 $0.001 $0.02 $0.003 $0.002 
 Max $2.23 $1.61 $6.54 $7.97 $11.14 $1.71 
Medium Mean $6.33 $3.08 $13.50 $16.76 $18.43 $3.82 
 Min $2.23 $1.62 $6.64 $8.11 $11.29 $1.71 
 Max $13.07 $5.11 $26.26 $31.01 $29.48 $6.56 
Large Mean $28.84 $10.24 $39.61 $51.91 $43.93 $11.01 
 Min $13.08 $5.11 $26.49 $33.01 $29.61 $6.63 
 Max $131.47 $42.09 $79.72 $131.47 $103.30 $40.84 
Note:   These bins were created by removing all of the zero LFP payments and then taking the bottom 25% of the 
payments for the small LFP payments, the middle 50% in the medium LFP payments, and the top 25% for large LFP 
payments of actual payments that were allocated.   
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Table 2: Rainfall Index (RI-PRF) Returns from Insurance Statistics, $ per acre 
Bins Statistic Combined California Kansas Nebraska Oklahoma Texas 
Overall Mean 
$2.03 $3.12 $2.42 $3.11 $1.49 $1.49 
 Min $-21.09 $-5.35 $-21.09 $-15.03 
$-9.27 $-9.73 
 Max $91.76 $12.49 $48.44 $91.76 
$28.37 $55.78 
Negative Mean 
$-1.85 $-0.43 $-2.91 $-2.27 $-2.33 $-1.31 
 Min 
$-21.09 $-5.35 $-21.09 $-15.03 $-9.27 $-9.73 
 Max 
$-0.36 $2.00 $-0.39 $-0.66 $-1.12 $-0.19 
Between Mean 
$1.22 $4.42 $1.25 $0.98 $0.92 $1.19 
 Min 
$-0.36 $2.01 $-0.37 $-0.67 $-1.06 $-0.18 
 Max 
$3.04 $7.08 $3.27 $4.09 $3.01 $2.63 
Positive Mean 
$8.45 $8.56 $3.28 $14.89 $5.95 $5.97 
 Min 
$3.04 $7.10 $3.28 $3.62 $3.02 $2.64 
 Max 
$91.76 $12.49 $48.44 $91.76 $28.37 $55.78 
Note:   After removing all the not enrolled acres, we created these bins by taking the bottom 25% of the returns for the 
negative return from insurance, the middle 50% in the between returns from insurance, and the top 25% for positive 
returns from insurance. 
26 
 
 
-0
.1
0
1
0
.0
3
2
-0
.0
6
6
-0
.1
5
5
-0
.2
1
5
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
1
7
-0
.0
7
6
-0
.0
5
2
-0
.0
6
3
-0
.0
5
-0
.0
1
2
-0
.0
1
3
-0
.0
8
1
0
.0
2
2
-0
.0
1
5
0
.0
4
4
0
.0
0
9
-0
.0
1
8
-0
.0
7
1
-0
.0
6
2
-0
.0
7
-0
.0
5
4
-0
.0
1
2
-0
.0
5
1
-0
.2
3
1
-0
.0
6
6
-0
.0
7
8
-0
.1
4
1
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
1
8
-0
.0
9
6
-0
.0
7
-0
.0
8
6
-0
.0
6
1
-0
.0
1
3
-0
.0
0
7
-0
.1
9
5
-0
.0
4
8
0
.0
5
1
0
.1
1
8
0
-0
.0
1
8
-0
.0
9
1
-0
.0
5
1
-0
.0
5
9
-0
.0
8
8
-0
.0
0
6
0
.0
5
4
0
.0
2
6
0
.0
7
7
0
.1
0
8
0
.1
7
8
0
.0
1
4
-0
.0
1
5
-0
.0
8
4
-0
.0
5
-0
.1
0
7
-0
.0
8
8
-0
.0
0
6
0
.0
9
5
-0
.0
1
7
0
.2
5
0
.0
5
0
.2
4
7
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
2
2
-0
.0
7
-0
.0
7
-0
.1
0
6
-0
.0
9
7
-0
.0
1
3
0
.3
4
2
0
.5
8
1
0
.3
5
4
0
.3
0
2
0
.4
4
2
0
.1
2
2
-0
.0
1
4
-0
.0
8
8
-0
.0
3
4
-0
.0
3
8
-0
.0
7
1
-0
.0
2
1
0
.4
1
5
0
.5
1
3
0
.4
6
9
0
.3
9
3
0
.6
0
1
0
.1
4
5
-0
.0
1
4
-0
.0
7
2
-0
.0
3
1
-0
.0
3
4
-0
.0
6
-0
.0
2
6
0
.3
9
1
0
.4
5
2
0
.4
7
4
0
.3
6
8
0
.4
3
7
0
.1
2
-0
.0
2
1
-0
.0
6
9
-0
.0
8
-0
.0
5
7
-0
.0
9
4
-0
.0
2
6
0
0
.4
9
7
0
.0
3
1
0
.0
7
1
0
.1
4
9
0
.0
4
8
-0
.0
1
8
-0
.3
4
9
-0
.0
2
4
-0
.0
2
4
-0
.0
4
8
-0
.0
1
1
0
.0
3
4
-0
.1
3
8
0
.1
6
6
-0
.1
7
9
0
.2
8
1
0
.0
2
4
-0
.0
2
9
-0
.0
8
2
-0
.1
0
2
-0
.1
1
9
-0
.0
9
1
-0
.0
1
5
N
o
te
: 
  
P
ar
en
th
es
is
 (
) 
in
d
ic
at
es
 s
ta
n
d
ar
d
 e
rr
o
r.
  
S
in
gl
e 
as
te
ri
sk
 (
*
) 
in
d
ic
at
es
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
 a
t 
th
e 
1
0
%
 l
ev
el
. 
  
D
o
u
b
le
 a
st
er
is
k
 (
*
*
) 
in
d
ic
at
es
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
 a
t 
th
e 
5
%
 l
ev
el
. 
 T
ri
p
le
 a
st
er
is
k
 (
*
*
*
) 
in
d
ic
at
es
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
 a
t 
th
e 
1
%
 l
ev
el
  
L
F
P
 i
s 
th
e 
L
iv
es
to
ck
 F
o
ra
ge
 D
is
as
te
r 
P
ay
m
en
t.
  
R
I-
P
R
F
 i
s 
th
e 
R
ai
n
fa
ll
 I
n
d
ex
 I
n
su
ra
n
ce
 f
o
r 
P
as
tu
re
, 
R
an
ge
la
n
d
, 
an
d
 F
o
ra
ge
. 
 I
n
 t
h
e 
co
m
b
in
ed
 m
o
d
el
, 
w
e 
u
se
d
 s
ta
te
 f
ix
ed
 e
ff
ec
ts
. 
 T
h
e 
st
at
e 
fi
xe
d
 e
ff
ec
ts
 a
re
 a
v
ai
la
b
le
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
au
th
o
r 
b
y
 r
eq
u
es
t.
*
*
*
L
o
g
(W
e
a
lt
h
)
*
*
*
*
L
o
g
(P
re
m
iu
m
)
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
P
o
si
ti
v
e
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
B
e
tw
e
e
n
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
R
e
tu
rn
 f
ro
m
 R
I-
P
R
F
 I
n
su
ra
n
c
e
 L
a
g
g
e
d
 v
s 
N
o
t 
E
n
ro
lle
d
 i
n
 R
I-
P
R
F
 L
a
g
g
e
d
N
e
g
a
ti
v
e
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
L
a
rg
e
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
M
e
d
iu
m
*
*
*
L
F
P
 P
a
y
m
e
n
ts
 L
a
g
g
e
d
 v
s 
Z
e
ro
 L
F
P
 P
a
y
m
e
n
ts
 L
a
g
g
e
d
S
m
a
ll
*
*
2
0
1
6
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
2
0
1
5
P
a
ra
m
e
te
r
Y
e
a
r 
In
d
ic
a
to
r 
v
s 
Y
e
a
r 
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
V
a
ri
a
b
le
P
a
ra
m
e
te
r
P
a
ra
m
e
te
r
P
a
ra
m
e
te
r
P
a
ra
m
e
te
r
P
a
ra
m
e
te
r
T
a
b
le
 3
. 
 S
e
le
c
ti
o
n
 M
o
d
e
l 
R
e
s
u
lt
s
 
M
a
rg
in
a
l 
E
ff
e
c
ts
 o
f 
S
e
le
c
ti
o
n
 i
n
to
 R
I-
P
R
F
C
o
m
b
in
e
d
C
a
lif
o
rn
ia
K
a
n
sa
s
N
e
b
ra
sk
a
O
k
la
h
o
m
a
T
e
x
a
s
27 
 
 
-0
.0
4
1
0
.2
1
4
-0
.0
1
7
-0
.0
9
4
-0
.0
2
6
-0
.0
4
5
-0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
5
3
-0
.0
1
-0
.0
1
6
-0
.0
1
9
-0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
0
4
0
.1
6
-0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
4
8
-0
.0
0
9
-0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
9
-0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
2
5
-0
.0
0
8
0
.0
0
9
-0
.1
4
4
-0
.0
1
2
-0
.0
3
5
-0
.0
5
9
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
1
1
-0
.4
6
1
-0
.0
2
3
-0
.0
3
8
-0
.0
2
5
-0
.0
3
0
.0
2
5
-0
.0
8
6
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
3
1
0
.0
3
5
-0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
6
8
-0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
1
4
-0
.0
1
4
-0
.0
1
1
0
.0
3
-0
.1
0
1
-0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
5
6
0
.0
3
-0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
6
5
-0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
1
6
-0
.0
1
6
-0
.0
1
3
0
.0
2
-0
.0
5
4
-0
.0
0
8
-0
.0
1
9
-0
.0
6
2
0
.0
2
3
-0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
6
5
-0
.0
1
5
-0
.0
2
1
-0
.0
2
8
-0
.0
1
4
-0
.0
1
7
0
.0
2
3
-0
.0
1
3
-0
.0
3
9
-0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
0
9
-0
.0
3
7
-0
.0
1
2
-0
.0
1
6
-0
.0
1
7
-0
.0
1
2
0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
2
4
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
4
2
0
.0
1
6
0
.0
1
8
-0
.0
0
8
-0
.0
4
1
-0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
1
6
-0
.0
1
7
-0
.0
1
2
0
.0
0
8
-0
.0
5
4
0
-0
.0
2
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
0
8
-0
.0
0
8
-0
.0
4
3
-0
.0
2
3
-0
.0
1
6
-0
.0
1
5
-0
.0
1
1
-0
.1
0
4
0
.8
-0
.0
1
6
-0
.1
0
3
0
.0
2
6
-0
.0
9
4
-0
.0
2
9
-1
.0
0
7
-0
.0
4
2
-0
.0
6
2
-0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
4
3
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
1
3
-0
.0
1
3
0
.0
4
6
-0
.0
7
9
0
.0
2
4
-0
.0
1
2
-0
.0
4
6
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
7
2
-0
.0
8
2
-0
.0
1
3
0
.0
6
3
0
.6
6
2
0
.1
8
8
-0
.1
1
9
0
.9
5
3
0
.2
5
1
-0
.1
3
6
-0
.8
8
7
-0
.2
1
4
-0
.7
7
3
-0
.8
7
5
-0
.1
4
6
R
2
0
.9
2
1
0
.8
9
3
0
.8
1
6
0
.7
1
9
0
.8
5
0
.9
3
5
*
N
o
te
: 
  
P
ar
en
th
es
is
 (
) 
in
d
ic
at
es
 s
ta
n
d
ar
d
 e
rr
o
r.
  
S
in
gl
e 
as
te
ri
sk
 (
*
) 
in
d
ic
at
es
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
 a
t 
th
e 
1
0
%
 l
ev
el
. 
  
D
o
u
b
le
 a
st
er
is
k
 (
*
*
) 
in
d
ic
at
es
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
 a
t 
th
e 
5
%
 l
ev
el
. 
 T
ri
p
le
 a
st
er
is
k
 (
*
*
*
) 
in
d
ic
at
es
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
 a
t 
th
e 
1
%
 l
ev
el
  
L
F
P
 i
s 
th
e 
L
iv
es
to
ck
 F
o
ra
ge
 D
is
as
te
r 
P
ay
m
en
t.
  
R
I-
P
R
F
 i
s 
th
e 
R
ai
n
fa
ll
 I
n
d
ex
 I
n
su
ra
n
ce
 f
o
r 
P
as
tu
re
, 
R
an
ge
la
n
d
, 
an
d
 F
o
ra
ge
. 
 C
o
u
n
ty
 f
ix
ed
 e
ff
ec
ts
 a
re
 n
o
t 
p
ro
v
id
ed
, 
b
u
t 
av
ai
la
b
le
 f
ro
m
 
au
th
o
r.
-0
.0
1
8
 
(0
.0
2
1
)
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
*
*
L
o
g
(W
e
a
lt
h
)
*
L
o
g
(P
re
m
iu
m
)
*
*
*
*
*
*
P
o
si
ti
v
e
B
e
tw
e
e
n
*
*
*
R
e
tu
rn
 f
ro
m
 R
I-
P
R
F
 I
n
su
ra
n
c
e
 L
a
g
g
e
d
 v
s 
N
o
t 
E
n
ro
lle
d
 i
n
 R
I-
P
R
F
 L
a
g
g
e
d
N
e
g
a
ti
v
e
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
L
a
rg
e
*
*
*
*
*
*
M
e
d
iu
m
*
*
*
*
L
F
P
 P
a
y
m
e
n
ts
 L
a
g
g
e
d
 v
s 
Z
e
ro
 L
F
P
 P
a
y
m
e
n
ts
 L
a
g
g
e
d
S
m
a
ll
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
2
0
1
6
*
*
*
*
2
0
1
5
*
*
P
a
ra
m
e
te
r
Y
e
a
r 
In
d
ic
a
to
r 
v
s 
Y
e
a
r 
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
V
a
ri
a
b
le
P
a
ra
m
e
te
r
P
a
ra
m
e
te
r
P
a
ra
m
e
te
r
P
a
ra
m
e
te
r
P
a
ra
m
e
te
r
T
a
b
le
 4
. 
 R
e
g
re
s
s
io
n
 M
o
d
e
l 
O
n
e
 R
e
s
u
lt
s
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
: 
P
e
rc
e
n
t 
o
f 
A
c
re
s 
E
n
ro
lle
d
 i
n
 R
I-
P
R
F
C
o
m
b
in
e
d
C
a
lif
o
rn
ia
K
a
n
sa
s
N
e
b
ra
sk
a
O
k
la
h
o
m
a
T
e
x
a
s
28 
 
 
3
.3
8
-1
.2
8
4
1
4
.9
2
8
1
4
.3
8
6
-1
.1
4
8
3
.2
8
4
-1
.0
6
7
-2
.4
6
1
-6
.9
0
2
-6
.8
2
3
-7
.4
6
6
-1
.5
8
4
-0
.4
1
4
0
.3
1
4
1
5
.4
5
4
7
.9
9
-0
.4
2
5
-1
.5
4
-1
.0
9
1
-4
.2
0
5
-8
.2
0
6
-8
.7
6
4
-6
.6
0
4
-0
.9
9
3
-9
.3
6
9
5
.4
8
2
8
.5
9
5
-4
.8
3
1
1
0
.5
4
4
-1
0
.3
1
6
-1
.3
8
1
-2
1
.5
8
3
-1
4
.3
2
-1
0
.5
1
9
-2
3
.4
0
1
-3
.6
9
1
2
.1
7
9
-0
.7
-8
.3
8
3
7
.5
9
2
0
.0
0
1
-3
.8
8
1
-1
.4
0
6
-3
.1
8
4
-6
.3
7
1
-6
.3
1
2
-6
.4
1
3
-1
.6
8
3
0
.8
0
4
2
.6
5
-0
.8
3
3
2
.6
9
1
2
4
.8
3
3
-5
.1
5
8
-1
.3
4
3
-2
.6
4
3
-7
.0
6
6
-6
.8
3
4
-6
.9
2
3
-2
.1
5
9
-1
.4
4
1
.5
9
1
1
6
.4
6
8
-0
.0
6
2
1
8
.8
3
7
-5
.9
3
8
-1
.6
1
1
-3
.0
4
-9
.0
9
9
-9
.0
8
-7
.3
6
4
-3
.1
8
9
2
.0
8
8
-2
.6
7
6
-8
.1
3
1
1
0
.2
8
8
-3
.3
3
7
6
.1
6
3
-1
.9
5
6
-1
.7
5
1
-7
.2
7
8
-7
.0
9
5
-5
.0
8
-8
.5
8
4
0
.6
5
-1
.4
8
6
-3
.6
6
2
1
.5
4
6
-8
.3
5
9
5
.4
6
5
-1
.7
6
8
-1
.9
4
-6
.7
5
1
-7
.1
3
9
-3
.3
1
2
-8
.3
4
4
0
.2
1
4
-0
.6
1
3
0
.4
9
9
7
.4
6
8
-6
.1
9
8
8
.9
2
7
-1
.7
5
6
-2
.0
3
2
-6
.8
7
9
-6
.7
8
1
-3
.8
-8
.4
7
4
4
2
.5
4
4
3
.8
4
9
2
2
.6
0
5
5
0
.3
2
1
1
9
.6
2
8
5
4
.3
6
5
-1
.1
1
7
-4
7
.1
4
7
-2
5
.6
7
3
-3
.4
6
8
-3
9
.1
6
-1
6
.6
8
1
-1
.4
6
9
1
.0
4
9
8
.0
2
4
-3
3
.8
6
3
-3
2
.8
8
8
3
.6
2
5
-2
.7
2
9
-2
.1
7
-1
2
.6
6
8
-3
1
.5
4
7
-1
9
.9
0
8
-3
.8
9
4
4
.5
2
8
2
.8
8
6
-5
2
.3
6
5
3
3
6
.9
5
2
3
4
0
.2
2
5
-3
6
.4
5
9
-3
0
.4
5
3
-4
1
.5
0
5
-1
3
5
.6
7
9
-3
3
7
.6
8
4
-2
1
4
.8
6
5
-4
3
.5
2
R
2
0
.9
1
0
.6
5
3
0
.6
6
0
.8
7
7
0
.9
1
1
0
.8
5
9
N
o
te
: 
  
P
ar
en
th
es
is
 (
) 
in
d
ic
at
es
 s
ta
n
d
ar
d
 e
rr
o
r.
  
S
in
gl
e 
as
te
ri
sk
 (
*
) 
in
d
ic
at
es
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
 a
t 
th
e 
1
0
%
 l
ev
el
. 
  
D
o
u
b
le
 a
st
er
is
k
 (
*
*
) 
in
d
ic
at
es
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
 a
t 
th
e 
5
%
 l
ev
el
. 
 T
ri
p
le
 a
st
er
is
k
 (
*
*
*
) 
in
d
ic
at
es
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
 a
t 
th
e 
1
%
 l
ev
el
  
L
F
P
 i
s 
th
e 
L
iv
es
to
ck
 F
o
ra
ge
 D
is
as
te
r 
P
ay
m
en
t.
  
R
I-
P
R
F
 i
s 
th
e 
R
ai
n
fa
ll
 I
n
d
ex
 I
n
su
ra
n
ce
 f
o
r 
P
as
tu
re
, 
R
an
ge
la
n
d
, 
an
d
 F
o
ra
ge
. 
  
C
o
u
n
ty
 f
ix
ed
 e
ff
ec
ts
 a
re
 n
o
t 
p
ro
v
id
ed
, 
b
u
t 
av
ai
la
b
le
 f
ro
m
 
au
th
o
r.
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
*
*
*
L
o
g
(W
e
a
lt
h
)
*
L
o
g
(P
re
m
iu
m
)
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
P
o
si
ti
v
e
B
e
tw
e
e
n
R
e
tu
rn
 f
ro
m
 R
I-
P
R
F
 I
n
su
ra
n
c
e
 L
a
g
g
e
d
 v
s 
N
o
t 
E
n
ro
lle
d
 i
n
 R
I-
P
R
F
 L
a
g
g
e
d
N
e
g
a
ti
v
e
*
*
*
*
*
L
a
rg
e
*
*
*
*
*
M
e
d
iu
m
L
F
P
 P
a
y
m
e
n
ts
 L
a
g
g
e
d
 v
s 
Z
e
ro
 L
F
P
 P
a
y
m
e
n
ts
 L
a
g
g
e
d
S
m
a
ll
*
*
*
*
*
2
0
1
6
*
*
*
*
*
*
2
0
1
5
*
P
a
ra
m
e
te
r
Y
e
a
r 
In
d
ic
a
to
r 
v
s 
Y
e
a
r 
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
V
a
ri
a
b
le
P
a
ra
m
e
te
r
P
a
ra
m
e
te
r
P
a
ra
m
e
te
r
P
a
ra
m
e
te
r
P
a
ra
m
e
te
r
T
a
b
le
 5
. 
 R
e
g
re
s
s
io
n
 M
o
d
e
l 
T
w
o
 R
e
s
u
lt
s
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
: 
L
ia
b
ili
ty
 P
e
r 
A
c
re
 
C
o
m
b
in
e
d
C
a
lif
o
rn
ia
K
a
n
sa
s
N
e
b
ra
sk
a
O
k
la
h
o
m
a
T
e
x
a
s
29 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Tradeoff between Insurance and Government Relief 
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 Chapter 2: Risk Implications from the Selection of Rainfall Index Insurance Intervals 
 
Introduction 
Since the passage of the 1994 Crop Insurance Reform Act, the federal crop 
insurance program has grown in both size and scope.  The program progressed from 
generating under $1 billion in premiums in 1994 to generating nearly $9.3 billion in 2016 
(USDA-RMA 1994, 2016c).  In 2007, the federal crop insurance program introduced the 
Rainfall Index (RI) and Vegetation Index (VI) Insurance Pilot Program for Pasture, 
Rangeland, and Forage (PRF) in selected states.  In 2016, RI-PRF replaced VI-PRF and 
was made available in all 48 contiguous states enrolling 28,538 policies and providing 
over a billion dollars in coverage on more than 52.3 million acres (USDA-RMA 2016c).  
However, insured acreage represents only about 8% of the total 649.5 million acres of 
pasture and hay land.  This small percent of coverage contrasts greatly to corn, where 
87% of acres were insured in 2016 (USDA-RMA 2016d).  
RI-PRF is constructed as an index; therefore, it contains “index based” benefits to 
the insurer (i.e., minimizing information asymmetry held by the insured).  The insurer 
designer must minimize basis risk (the risk uncovered by the index), while attempting to 
maintain contract transparency, containing delivery, marketing, and reinsurance costs 
(Miranda and Farrin 2012).  A key feature making RI-PRF unique from other index based 
insurance products is that the insured selects the protected time frame (i.e., insurance 
intervals).  Insurance intervals across different months open the door for different levels 
of basis risk between forage production and precipitation as well as the insured to select 
contracts with impacts the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation never intended.  As a 
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result, RI-PRF insurance intervals may perhaps contain different levels of basis risk, 
possibly at values higher than anticipated, which could result in a misallocation of 
government resources (i.e., subsidies).  
In this paper, we empirically examine the financial outcomes from forage 
production and RI-PRF insurance participation in two locations in Nebraska.  Both 
locations provide historical forage production and precipitation data, allowing us to 
examine the relation between RI-PRF indemnities and forage production.  Specifically, 
we focus the decision by the government to allow the insured to select the insurance 
interval.  We examine how the insurance intervals impact producer expected net income 
and net income risk, and government program cost.  Results from our analysis can help 
policymakers improve the effectiveness of RI-PRF insurance. 
This article proceeds as follows.  We first provide a review of index based 
insurance followed by a description of the RI-PRF insurance program.  We then 
introduce the conceptual model with a description of the data, methods and empirical 
analysis.  Findings are presented and interpreted in the results section, with conclusions 
in the last section.  
 
Index Based Insurance  
When purchasing insurance, risk faced by the producer declines as net income 
becomes less variable due to indemnities being paid during low yield events and 
premiums being paid (no indemnities) during high yield events.  However, if the index is 
loosely related to yields then risk may not always be reduced.  To the government, if 
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yields are loosely related to the index would go against their goal of providing an 
effective risk management program.  
Previous literature has identified both advantages and disadvantages of index 
based insurance.  Benefits exist from the fact that index insurance minimizes the 
incidence of opportunistic behavior stemming from moral hazard and/or adverse selection 
(Miranda 1991).  Miranda (1991) documented that the primary concern with index 
insurance is that the relation between indemnity payments and actual production are not 
entirely dependent on each other, i.e., basis risk.  Norton, Turvey, and Osgood (2012) 
found that the strongest correlation of index insurance payouts occurred when there was 
minimal distance between the index and the farm.  Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2013) 
found that the closer the weather station to the production site, the smaller the basis risk 
between precipitation and production.  Norton, Boucher, and Chiu (2015) found that 
index insurance based on multiple weather station data reduced basis risk.  Conradt, 
Finger, and Bokusheva (2015) found that index insurance contract design, specifically 
Quantile Regression, can improve the relation between yields and the index.  As a result, 
index insurance will not always provide indemnities when a production loss is 
experienced; whereas, traditional multi-peril crop insurance provides indemnities when 
there is a loss (Smith and Watts 2009; Kang 2007).  Rainfall indexes typically have 
greater basis risk than yield based indexes (Smith and Watts 2009).  Precipitation 
represents only one factor impacting forage production (Dahl 1963; Sims and Singh 
1978) and other perils can influence production.   
Since 2007, when RI-PRF was introduced as a pilot program, research has 
focused on the various features of the program. For example, Nadolnyak and Vedenov 
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(2013) found that a higher correlation between the rainfall index and yield improves 
welfare by lowering risk.  Ifft, Wu, and Kuethe (2014) focused on the impacts of PRF 
insurance on farmland values and reported that the availability of the insurance increases 
pastureland values by at least 4%.  RI-PRF literature is thin, but valuable insights can be 
gained from other index insurance research evaluating precipitation or rainfall.  For 
example, Müller et al. (2011) examined rainfall as part of the production of green 
biomass, stating that rainfall index insurance took away from “natural insurance”, taking 
care of the land as if it were never insured, when the trigger level is high.  Similar to RI-
PRF insurance, Maples, Brorsen, and Biermacher(2016) evaluated rainfall index pilot 
program for annual forage production and found the index to be well designed with a 
high correlation between the index and rainfall.  
 Correlation analysis has historically been the metric used to evaluate the 
effectiveness (level of basis risk) of index based insurance.  Clarke (2016) provides a 
good explanation on how the value of an index insurance product will be dependent on 
the correlation between index and insured loss.  For a thorough review of index based 
insurance using correlation analysis see Smith and Watts (2009).  Along with their 
thorough review, Smith and Watts (2009) identify research where correlations between 
precipitation and biomass vary from a low of .026 (forage production in Sahel area of 
Africa) to a high of 0.80 (grass production in New Mexico) with an average of 0.60.  
Since Smith and Watts (2009), additional research has evaluated index insurance also 
using correlation analysis (Norton, Turvey, and Osgood 2012; Mobarak and Rosenzweig 
2013; Norton, Boucher, and Chiu 2015; Maples, Brorsen, and Biermacher 2016).  
Correlation identifies the strength of the relation between two variables and in index 
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insurance the two variables are generally the index and yield (or possibly the same 
parameter the index is measuring at the farm, such as precipitation).  While correlation 
measures are useful, they can provide an incomplete picture.  Our approach of evaluating 
financial outcomes through the use of the variance of net income from RI-PRF interval 
selection allows for a more precise identification of the financial risk reducing 
effectiveness of RI-PRF interval selection because purchasing an insurance contract must 
lower the variance of net income through indemnities being greater than premium in low 
production years and a premium cost in high production years. 
RI-PRF Program  
RI-PRF represents a single peril (precipitation) index insurance product focusing 
on the production of perennial forages on rangeland, pastureland, and cropland.9  The 
objective of RI-PRF is to provide perennial forage producers revenue (indemnities) due 
to losses in precipitation.  RI-PRF differs from the traditional index insurance by insuring 
precipitation over a specific period (two-month intervals) versus production at some 
aggregate level (typically county).  Additionally, the producer is able to choose under 
which practice they would insure their forage, either haying or grazing.  If the producer 
uses land for both, the producer would choose which practice is most beneficial to them 
based on their own risk preferences.  The current study analyzes the haying option. 
                                                          
9 While the Risk Management Agency (RMA) uses the term rainfall in the title of the insurance product, 
they are actually measuring precipitation from the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration Climate 
Prediction Center (NOAA CPC).  Rainfall and precipitation are used interchangeably in this manuscript to 
describe precipitation in the form of rainfall, snow, sleet, and other forms.   
35 
 
 
To be eligible for RI-PRF, the producer is required to have a share on insurable 
acreage that was in production before July 1 prior to the coverage year.  RI-PRF offers a 
variety of contracts based on varying coverage levels and productivity factors.  Coverage 
levels are chosen from 70%, 75%, 80%, 85%, and 90% varying by county and production 
type.  Productivity factors vary from 60% to 150% of county base value in 1% 
increments.  The productivity factor allows producers to adjust forage value, in dollars 
per acre, based on their specific land productivity.  For example, a producer who finds 
their land to be of highest value relative to the county base level would choose 150% 
productivity factor (USDA-RMA 2016a).  RI-PRF insures by grids: 0.25 degrees latitude 
by 0.25 longitude at the equator, which translates into grids of about 17 by 17 miles.  
Grids were created by the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration Climate 
Prediction Center (NOAA CPC) and do not follow geopolitical boundaries, with some 
grids being uninsurable.  The gridded precipitation data represents an interpolated value 
based on the entire grid and cannot be traced to a single point or reporting station.  An 
expected grid index is calculated for each grid and index interval using long-term, 
historical, gridded precipitation data (USDA-RMA 2015c).  RI-PRF requires the 
producer to insure monthly precipitation using two-month intervals.  The two-month 
interval rule results in eleven insurance intervals during the calendar year: January-
February, February-March, March-April, April-May, May-June, June-July, July-August, 
August-September, September-October, October-November, and November-December.  
RI-PRF rules require that producers must insure at least two intervals and intervals 
cannot overlap (i.e., cannot insure January-February interval and February-March 
interval) effectively limiting the maximum number of intervals to six.  Intervals are 
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weighted with a minimum weight of 10% and a maximum weight of 60% requiring the 
sum of weights to add up to 100%.  Losses are calculated based on whether the current 
year’s precipitation in a grid has deviated from the historical normal precipitation in the 
same grid, for the same interval.  An indemnity will be paid if 
 
(1)              𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 =
(𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥−𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥)
𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
> 0 
 
where the trigger grid index is equal to the insured’s coverage level multiplied by the 
expected grid index and the final grid index represents NOAA’s interpolated current year 
gridded precipitation data or successor data for each grid ID and index interval (USDA-
RMA 2015c).  Expected grid index or expected precipitation is the mean accumulated 
precipitation by both grid and insurance interval, calculated using NOAA’s interpolated 
historical gridded precipitation or successor data and expressed as a percentage with 
mean equal to 100 (USDA-RMA 2016a).   
 The size of the indemnity depends upon the size of the policy protection per unit –
calculated as 
 
(2)               𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 
= 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 ∗ 𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
 
where insured acres identify the size of the insured area, producer share identifies the 
forage share belonging to the producer, and dollar amount of protection is calculated as 
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(3)              𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
= 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 
 
where county base value represents the forage value in the county and is determined by 
the RMA (USDA-RMA 2016a). 
Indemnity is then calculated as 
 
(4)             𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 
 
The Federal Government subsidizes the premiums for RI-PRF, which have not 
changed since the introduction of the pilot program.  The 70% and 75% coverage levels 
are subsidized at 59% of the premium.  For coverage levels of 80% and 85%, 55% of the 
premium is subsidized.  Lastly, for 90% coverage level, 51% of the premium is 
subsidized.  
 
Conceptual Model 
 Our conceptual model modifies Maples, Brorsen, and Biermacher (2016), by 
allowing monthly insurance interval selection in a perennial forage system.  We assume 
producers are risk averse, expected-utility maximizers and can choose to purchase 
insurance.  If producers insure, they are able to select from a portfolio of contracts based 
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upon coverage level, productivity factor, and insurance intervals.  Expected utility is 
written as  
(5)                                                              max
𝐴∈{0,1}
70≤𝛿≤90
60≤𝜑≤150
𝛼∈{1,11}
𝐸𝑈(𝜋) = ∬ 𝑈(𝜋)ƒ(𝜃)𝑑𝜆𝑑𝑌 
s. t. π =  PY +  A (𝑘(max((𝛿 − 𝐹)/𝛿, 0)) − 𝑐(𝛿, 𝜑, 𝛼)) − 𝐫′𝐳 
                                                                     𝜃 = [𝜆, 𝑌] 
                                                                                     𝑘 = 𝐵(𝛼)𝛿𝜑 
                                                              𝑈′(𝜋) > 0, 𝑈′′(𝜋) < 0 
 
where 𝐸𝑈(𝜋)is expected utility of net income, P is the price for each unit of production, 
λ represents RI-PRF index insurance policy , Y is production per unit, A is a discrete 
choice variable equaling 1 when a producer chooses to insure and 0 if the producer does 
not insure, α reflects the chosen insurance interval (minimum of two and maximum of 
six) out of the 11, k is the policy protection per unit, B is the county base value dependent 
upon the insurance interval, δ is the trigger grid index, F is the final grid index,  𝜑 is the 
productivity factor adjustment, c represents producer insurance premium, r is a vector of 
other input costs, z is a vector of other inputs, θ represents the joint distribution of the 
index value and production and U’ (π) and U” (π) are the first and second derivatives of 
the net income function.  The monthly interval weights have been left out for simplicity 
in the equation, but not in the analysis. 
 Our primary objective is to focus on the risk reducing aspects of different 
insurance intervals, 𝛼.  As a result, we focus on evaluating producer net income and risk 
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(measured as variance of net income) by comparing multiple insurance intervals to no 
insurance.  Each insurance interval will likely have a different relation (basis risk) 
between observed production and return from insurance participation and, therefore, a 
different impact on the variance of net incomes.  The impact on variance of net incomes 
identifies the risk reducing aspects of RI-PRF insurance intervals.  A low relation 
between production and net income from a specific insurance interval can do one of two 
things.  First, it can cause a producer who experiences low production to pay a premium 
without an indemnity, lowering net income even further than if there were no insurance.  
Second, it could cause a producer who experiences high production to receive a large 
indemnity thereby increasing net income further than without insurance.  In either one of 
these cases, the variance of net income would increase rather than decrease.  A properly 
functioning insurance contract would reduce the variance of net income.  A strong 
relation between precipitation and forage production would imply insurance payments 
when a low production event is observed, thereby reducing producer net income risk.  
Because RI-PRF insurance intervals are expected to reduce risk, the hypothesis would be 
rejected by empirical evidence that insurance intervals generate higher variance than not 
purchasing an RI-PRF insurance policy (i.e., no insurance).  
To further explain our approach, Figure 1 displays the change in risk versus 
reward when purchasing a subsidized index insurance policy.  Point A represents the 
producer with no insurance.  At this point the producer would face R returns and X risk.  
Purchasing insurance will cause the producer to move into one of the four quadrants. 
Zones I and IV represent outcomes where the subsidized insurance is not working 
correctly and producer returns are lower than expected.  Zone I portrays a traditional 
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insurance contract where the producer pays a premium, in order to reduce risk, thereby 
lowering returns.  Zone IV shows the region where a premium paid results in a reduction 
in returns but risk increased.   
Zones II and III represent outcomes with subsidized insurance working properly.  
In Zone II and Zone III the producer paid a subsidized premium therefore seeing 
increased returns over time compared to no subsidized insurance.  Zone II is a subsidized 
and well-functioning insurance markets as risk was also reduced.  Outcomes in Zone III 
imply a subsidy transfer but not a reduction in risk.  Outcomes in Zones III or IV, lead to 
an increase in risk, violating RMA’s stated goal of an effective risk management 
program.   
Data 
Data were obtained from two University of Nebraska-Lincoln research ranches, 
one located in the central Sandhills and the other in the eastern Sandhills of Nebraska.  
The two research ranches are operated to reflect actual ranch production practices and 
management.  The first site is the Gudmundsen Sandhills Laboratory (GSL), located in 
Grant, Hooker, and Cherry counties.  Data from GSL range from 2004 to 2015.  The 
second site, Barta Brothers Ranch (BBR), is located approximately 140 miles to the east 
of GSL in Rock and Brown counties.  Data from BBR is from 2001 to 2015.  Both sites 
represent upland Sandhills rangeland dominated by a mixture of native warm-season 
grasses and cool-season grasses along with common prairie forbs and shrubs (Schacht et 
al. 2000).  The Sandhills represent 95% of all rangeland in Nebraska, where the 
predominate use is for livestock (Adams et al. 1998).  Each research site had on-site 
41 
 
 
weather station that provided daily precipitation values which were aggregated up to 
monthly values for evaluation.  
Along with the precipitation data, each site had detailed information on annual 
forage production from pastures in a simple rotational grazing system.  Exclosures, an 
area to keep unwanted animals out (1.2 x 1.2m wire panels), were placed randomly in 
pastures at each site; there were 36 exclosures at GSL and 60 exclosures at BBR.  
Exclosures were moved to a new location at the beginning of each year in order for 
vegetation in exclosures to represent plant production of an area that had been harvested 
in previous years. In our semi-arid environment in mid-August, both cool season and 
warm season grasses have reached maturity. These grasses were hand-clipped at ground 
level in a 0.25m x 1.0m area placed within the exclosure.  All herbaceous material was 
separated in functional groups consisting of warm-season grasses, cool-season grasses, 
sedges, and forbs. Current year’s growth of shrubs (i.e., leaves and new stem tissue) was 
collected from plants rooted within the quadrats.  Standing dead plant material and litter 
were also collected.  All separated plant material was placed in paper bags, oven dried 
(60°C) to a constant weight, and then recorded.   
Our data comes from a relatively short time period of 12 years at GSL and 15 
years at BBR.  As a result, it is possible that our results could be due to differences in our 
time period.  As a result, we plot our historical farm and county forage yield (1978 to 
2014USDA-National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) county hay yield excluding 
alfalfa) for both locations and calculate the Pearson correlation coefficient.  Plots are 
presented in Figure 2.  Strong correlation was found to exist between farm and county 
42 
 
 
production for both locations with correlation coefficients of 0.69 at GSL and 0.81 at 
BBR.    
Hay price was based off of the USDA-NASS annual hay price excluding alfalfa 
for the state of Nebraska (USDA-NASS 2016a).  The average yearly price in 2015 was 
$0.03975 per pound of hay, and we assumed the same price for all years to not add 
unnecessary noise to the model. 
Methods 
   We first identify whether a relation exists between farm precipitation and farm 
production by formulating and evaluating a precipitation response equation.  This helps 
identify whether precipitation is a good predictor of forage production or not in our study 
area.  The forage response from precipitation may not be monotonic, therefore a linear 
relation between precipitation and production may not be appropriate (Azzam and 
Sekkat, 2005).  Following Azzam and Sekkat (2005), we describe the relation between 
precipitation and yields using a gamma curve.  Forage production, 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡, for a specific 
exclosure i (i=1,...,Z)10 at location j (j = 0,1) in year t (t= 1,…,12 or 15 (depending upon 
location)) is specified as a function of annual precipitation (𝑅) and dummy variable for 
location (𝐷): 
(6) 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝑘𝑒
−𝛿𝑅𝑗𝑡𝑅𝑗𝑡
𝜌
+ 𝛾𝐷𝑗  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝛿 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜌 > 0 
where 𝑘, 𝛿, 𝜌 are the scalar, rate, and shape parameters to be estimated and 𝛾 is the 
parameter for the location dummy variable.  Location controls unobserved fixed effects 
                                                          
10 Z represents the number of exclosures ranging between 36 and 60, depending upon location and year. 
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from geographic heterogeneity in local weather and other factors. To estimate equation 
(6) we take the log of the gamma curve.  STATA 13.1 was used for the estimation.  
From our conceptual framework, we evaluate the risk reducing impacts of RI-
PRF.  Our evaluation is derived from the theory that producers are risk averse and seek to 
maximize expected utility.  Additionally, the insurance provider offers an insurance 
product which is intended to reduce risk.  The presence of the subsidy provides the 
opportunity for indemnities to be greater than producer paid premiums.11  Our hypothesis, 
that RI-PRF insurance intervals are an effective risk management tool, would be rejected 
if net income risk is found to increase (Figure 1, Zone III and Zone IV).   
With many different RI-PRF contract combinations available to producers we 
identified and evaluate six different insurance scenarios making sure we take into account 
precipitation extremes (low and high precipitation, discussed in detail below) and 
personal correspondence with producers.12  Using expected monthly precipitation at the 
farm for each location we categorized months into three precipitation categories: low, 
high, and medium, Figure 3.  As illustrated in Figure 3, the low precipitation category 
includes: November, December, January, February, and March.  The high precipitation 
category includes: April, May June, July, and August.  The medium precipitation 
category includes September and October.  With only two medium precipitation months 
and RI-PRF requiring a minimum of four months we are unable to evaluate the medium 
                                                          
11 With insurance being rated so that over a sufficient amount of time: premium = indemnity so that the 
loss ratio (indemnity/premium) = 1.  The subsidy effectively increases producer return by lowering 
premiums so that the loss ratio > 1.   
12 Our approach of examining precipitation extremes allows us to greatly lower the number of scenarios 
evaluated. 
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precipitation category exclusively.  We evaluate two high precipitation insurance 
scenarios with one being early in the growing season (high early) and one later in the 
growing season (high late) and one low precipitation insurance scenario.  We evaluate 
three other scenarios which are a blend of precipitation categories.  These three scenarios 
are: low/high, high/medium/low, and medium/low.13  
In order to specifically analyze the risk reducing effectiveness of different 
insurance scenarios, we evaluate yearly returns from insurance scenarios at each location, 
holding coverage level, productivity factor, and output prices constant.  Each of the 
scenarios selected was insuring hay production at the 90% level, with a 100% 
productivity factor.  We chose the coverage level to insure the highest amount of 
precipitation.  The productivity factor was chosen so that the dollar amount of protection 
approximated the expected value of production compared to the county based production 
values.14   
  RI-PRF insurance period is based on the calendar year, not on the forage 
production year.  As a result, a producer buying RI-PRF could select insurance periods 
which effectively would be insuring the following year’s production.  Because we are 
interested in evaluating the risk reducing aspects of RI-PRF, we moved the insurance 
period to start September 1.  This modification allows us to correctly link insurance 
periods to the production year.   
                                                          
13 The following are the interval selections for each scenario: Low represents Jan/Feb and Nov/Dec; 
Low/High represents Jan/Feb and May/Jun: High Early represents Apr/May and Jun/Jul: High Late 
represents May/Jun and Jul/Aug; High/Medium/Low represents Aug/Sep and Oct/Nov; and Medium/Low 
represents Sep/Oct and Nov/Dec. 
14 Both 150% and 60% productivity factors were evaluated to identify the influence of the productivity 
factor on net income.   
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The RMA offers insurance to protect producers against sufficiently large losses in 
production (or revenue when prices are insured).  For each evaluated insurance scenario 
and no insurance, we evaluated total net income.  To identify the reduction in risk we 
calculated the variance from each insurance contract combination and compared them to 
no insurance.   
 
Results 
Average monthly precipitation for both GSL and BBR are presented in Figure 3.15  
Results indicate large variation in average historical monthly precipitation with 
November through March exhibiting low precipitation values and April through August 
with high precipitation.  For GSL, average precipitation varied from a low of 0.26 inch in 
December to a high of 4.37 inches in June.  For BBR, results were similar, with the low 
being 0.39 inch in January to a high of 4.32 inches in June.  Recall that in RI-PRF each 
insurable interval’s trigger grid index is expressed as a percentage with mean 100.  With 
a 90% coverage level (or a 10% deducible), precipitation at GSL in November/December 
interval would need to drop 0.058 inch to trigger a payment.  For a May/June interval, 
precipitation at GSL would need to drop 0.763 inch, which happens to be more than the 
expected precipitation in November/December interval.  Insuring precipitation declines 
greater than 0.058 inch is substantially different than insuring precipitation declines 
greater than 0.763 inch.  
                                                          
15 RI-PRF weather station monthly precipitation is unavailable.  With both locations displaying similar 
monthly average precipitation totals, it is likely that RI-PRF weather station data exhibit similar patterns.   
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Interval premium rates by location are presented in Table 1.  While the policy 
protection per unit is the same across both locations and interval, the premium rates differ 
greatly.  For BBR, the premium rate per $100 of coverage at the 90% coverage level 
varied from a low of $12.37 in May/June interval to a high of $25.84 in 
November/December interval.16  Production months during high expected precipitation 
have a smaller premium rate; whereas other months, such as low expected precipitation 
months, reflect a larger premium rate.  With the subsidy being applied as a percentage of 
premium, the difference between producer paid premium rates in production months and 
non-production months becomes smaller.  The subsidy effectively makes it more 
appealing (i.e., more subsidy dollars per acre) for producers to insure during the months 
with higher premium rates.  For example, using GSL location, insuring 
November/December interval provides $10.17 in subsidy per acre whereas insuring in 
May/June interval provides less than half of the subsidy dollars or $4.93 in subsidy per 
acre.  
 Forage production parameter estimates from the regression model, equation 6, are 
reported in Table 2. Estimated coefficients in the regression model were found to be 
significant for the scalar, rate and location dummy.  Thus, precipitation was found to be a 
good predictor of forage production.  The location dummy variable was significant and 
negative with BBR expecting 202.24 fewer pounds of forage than GSL.  The 𝑅2 value of 
                                                          
16 The maximum and minimum premium rates at the 90% coverage level are identical between both BBR 
and GSL locations.  Premium rates were different for other insurance intervals and coverage levels.   
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0.72 indicates our precipitation model accounts for a substantial amount of variation in 
forage production.17 
Table 3 provides a historical view of annual production deviation from predicted 
production ((actual production- expected production)/ expected production), actual 
production and RI-PRF insurance net returns from insurance participation (indemnity-
premium) from the six different insurance scenarios at both locations taking into account 
precipitation extremes and personal correspondence with producers.  We calculated 
yearly returns from insurance using current RI-PRF premiums and calculating 
indemnities by identifying precipitation compared to the trigger index (RMA 2016a).  At 
GSL, forage production was higher than expected in eight out of twelve years.  At BBR, 
higher forage production was observed in ten out of fifteen years.  At both GSL and 
BBR, all insurance scenarios had positive average net returns over their respective study 
period which is not surprising given a 51% premium subsidy associated with the 90% 
coverage level.  The top two highest average net returns at GSL were found in the 
medium/low and the low insurance scenario with average net returns of $9.01 and $7.59 
per acre, respectively.  For BBR, the top two highest average net returns were found in 
the low ($15.30) and low/high ($10.78) insurance scenarios.  In both locations, we find 
highly variable net returns from the different insurance scenarios with a positive or 
negative deviation from predicted production.  In 2006, for instance, at the GSL location, 
actual production was 11% higher than expected; however, all insurance scenarios 
generated a positive net return per acre.  At the GSL location, a 36% production loss was 
                                                          
17 Graph of the residuals and expected values indicated randomness.   
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experienced in 2009 and all insurance scenarios paid more in premiums than were paid 
back in indemnities, a result indicating the worst outcome for a producer, paying 
insurance premiums and experiencing a large production shortfall.  For BBR, their largest 
deviation was in 2001, with an 82% production loss, and for all but one 
(high/medium/low) insurance scenarios premiums were greater than indemnities.  The 
opposite result was found in 2012 where actual production was 128% higher than 
expected and all insurance scenarios except high/medium/low resulted in very large net 
returns.   
Forage production expected net income from no insurance and the six insurance 
scenarios are presented in Table 4.  For each year, we calculate net income as revenue 
from production plus indemnity minus producer paid premium (subsidy removed).  Net 
income for no insurance is simply revenue from forage production for the specific year.  
Figures 4 (GSL) and 5 (BBR) graphically portray averages and variances from no 
insurance and the six insurance scenarios from Table 4.  Results indicate that average net 
income from all insurance scenarios are greater than no insurance in both locations.18  
This is an expected result given producers’ premiums being subsidized.  To determine 
whether the intervals in the scenarios are working as intended to reduce risk, we examine 
the variance of net income.  An increase in variance indicates intervals are not working as 
intended.  Results indicate that variance increases and decreases, depending upon the 
insurance scenario and location.   
                                                          
8 The high early insurance scenario at Gudmundsen increases the return by a negligible amount of $0.05 
per acre. 
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At GSL, we find three insurance scenarios, high early, high late, and medium/low 
reduce net income risk over no insurance.  The high early insurance policy results in the 
largest decline in risk.  We find three insurance scenarios lead to increases in risk: 
low/high, high/medium/low, and low.  The low insurance scenario leads to the largest 
increase in risk and comes from intervals with low expected precipitation.  Additionally, 
the low insurance scenario provides the second highest net income, behind the 
medium/low insurance scenario.  The medium/low insurance scenario provides the 
highest net income while slightly lowering risk to the producer.  Under current RMA 
rules that uses a calendar year, in order to insure in the medium/low (fall season months) 
insurance scenario, the producer would forego any insurance benefits in the current 
forage production year so they can insure the following year’s production.  The result that 
medium/low insurance scenario, which occurs during the fall, reduces risk suggests that 
the RMA should consider moving the insurance period to follow the forage production 
year instead of the calendar year.  From the perspective of the risk averse producer they 
would select insurance scenario between the three risk reducing options.  Producers with 
low levels of risk aversion could select medium/low insurance scenario and a highly risk 
averse producer would select high early insurance scenario.19  From the perspective of the 
RMA in that they are mandated to provide an effective risk management program they 
would discontinue all risk increasing scenarios.  As a result, the medium/low insurance 
scenario would disappear due to low insurance scenario intervals no longer being 
                                                          
19 As a robustness check, we estimated the maximum (150%) and minimum (60%) productivity factors and 
found similar results.  All scenarios except two stayed in their original risk zone and none moved to a 
lower expected return (zones I and IV).  At GSL, high/late 150% productivity factor moved from risk 
reducing to increasing and high/medium/low moved from risk increasing to reducing.   
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available.  Producers would then choose between high early and high late insurance 
scenarios. 
  For BBR we again find three insurance scenarios reduce risk (high early, high 
late, low/high) and three that increase risk (low, high/medium/low, and medium/low).  
The low/high insurance scenario provides the highest reduction in risk and the second 
highest increase in expected income.  The low insurance scenario provides the highest 
increase in expected income; however, it also increases risk.  At BBR, the risk averse 
producer would always select low/high insurance scenario because it provides the lowest 
risk at the highest expected income.  It should be noted that high late and high early 
insurance scenarios are close in proximity to low/high insurance scenario.  From the 
perspective of the RMA they would discontinue the three risk increasing insurance 
scenarios.  Additionally, dropping the low insurance scenario removes the incentive to 
maximize insurance returns, saves RMA the most subsidy dollars since this scenario 
results in the highest total premium.  As a result of dropping risk increasing scenario, the 
low/high insurance scenario would disappear due to low insurance scenario intervals no 
longer being available.  Producers would then choose between the risk reducing high 
early insurance scenario and high late insurance scenario. 
  Results indicate that low and high/medium/low insurance scenarios were risk 
increasing at both locations.  The medium/low insurance scenario switches from risk 
reducing at GSL to risk increasing at BBR.  The low/high insurance scenario changes 
from risk increasing (slightly) in GSL to risk reducing in BBR.  Changes in the 
effectiveness of risk management between locations provide insights into differences in 
risks faced by different locations as well as the functionality of RI-PRF.  Note that 
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dropping low scenario intervals makes risk reducing scenarios identical between both 
locations.  
  
Conclusions 
In this paper, we investigated the relation between RI-PRF interval selection and 
forage production at two locations in Nebraska.  Our primary goal was to examine 
whether RI-PRF insurance intervals selection provide an effective risk management 
program.  Our findings help insurance agents and policy makers improve RI-PRF 
insurance in order to provide desired outcomes. 
Risk was assessed by evaluating the change in the variance of net income when 
purchasing insurance with different insurance intervals.  Our finding suggest risk 
increasing insurance intervals exist at both locations.  We also found one insurance 
scenario (low in BBR) that provided the highest net income while increasing risk, 
suggesting a profit maximizing opportunity.  Dropping risk increasing intervals removes 
the one identified case where profit maximizing behavior was found.   
Our results indicate RI-PRF reduces net income risk with intervals insuring 
during high expected precipitation (growing season); while net income risk increases 
with intervals insuring low expected precipitation (non-growing season, winter months).  
As a result, we are unsure whether it is the growing season or size of expected 
precipitation contributing to insurance interval effectiveness.  There is no doubt that the 
value of expected precipitation influences the precipitation deviation, indemnity and 
expected production.  Rainfall during winter months will not contribute to crop growth if 
it evaporates or drains away, which is especially true on the sandy soils that are found on 
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the ranches evaluated in this study.  Recall, that a drop of only 0.058 inch would trigger 
an indemnity at GSL during November/December interval whereas in May/June interval 
the drop would need to exceed 0.763 inch.  It could be possible that in some locations a 
small drop in precipitation could impact production, if it was during the growing season.  
Insuring during the growing season appears logical because insurance results indicate the 
strongest decline in net income risk.  Future research could help shed the light on whether 
amount of expected precipitation or the season contributes more or less to the risk 
reducing effectiveness of RI-PRF insurance.   
While we find no risk management benefits from insuring during the low 
expected precipitation intervals, which are during the winter, for these two locations in 
Nebraska, locations farther south in the U.S. may have benefits due to different 
expectations on monthly precipitation and the growing season occurring earlier in the 
calendar year. 
Our findings suggest that insurance in the medium/low scenario at GSL lowers 
risk.  With RI-PRF insurance operating on a calendar year and forage production 
following a plant production year, it is difficult to insure the medium/low scenario 
because it insures during fall expected precipitation, which would be past the upcoming 
production year.  Moving the insurance period to correspond with the forage production 
year would overcome this obstacle.    Identifying the correct plant production year in each 
region would be paramount in developing a more complete insurance product. 
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Appendix 
  
Table 1: Insurance Premiums for Both Locations 
Location Intervals Policy 
Protection 
Per Unit 
Premium 
Rate Per 
$100 
Total 
Premium 
Premium 
Subsidy 
 
Producer 
Premium 
GSL Jan/Feb $74 25.24 18.68 9.53 9.15  
Feb/Mar $74 20.91 15.47 7.89 7.58  
Mar/Apr $74 16.71 12.37 6.31 6.06  
Apr/May $74 13.71 10.15 5.17 4.97  
May/Jun $74 13.07 9.67 4.93 4.74  
Jun/Jul $74 13.57 10.04 5.12 4.92  
Jul/Aug $74 14.15 10.47 5.34 5.13  
Aug/Sep $74 16.72 12.37 6.31 6.06  
Sep/Oct $74 22.10 16.72 8.34 8.01  
Oct/Nov $74 23.25 17.21 8.77 8.43  
Nov/Dec $74 26.95 19.94 10.17 9.77 
BBR Jan/Feb $74 21.54 15.94 8.13 7.81  
Feb/Mar $74 20.55 15.21 7.76 7.45  
Mar/Apr $74 15.55 11.51 5.87 5.64  
Apr/May $74 16.42 12.15 6.20 5.95  
May/Jun $74 12.37 9.15 4.67 4.49  
Jun/Jul $74 13.90 10.29 5.25 5.04  
Jul/Aug $74 12.88 9.53 4.86 4.67  
Aug/Sep $74 14.85 10.99 5.60 5.38  
Sep/Oct $74 19.22 14.22 7.25 6.97  
Oct/Nov $74 25.41 18.80 9.59 9.21 
 Nov/Dec $74 25.84 19.12 9.75 9.37 
Note:  GSL = Gudmundsen Sandhills Laboratory.  BBR= Barta Brothers 
Ranch. 
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Table 2.  Effect of Yearly Precipitation on Forage Production 
 Forage Production (pounds per acre) 
Variable Parameter Robust Standard Error 
𝑘 (scalar) 750.36* 427.390 
𝛿 (rate) -0.038** 0.015 
𝜌 (shape) -0.026 0.291 
𝛾 (location, BBR=1) -
202.24*** 
42.494 
R2 0.7135  
Note:  Single asterisk (*) indicates significance at the 10% level.   
Double asterisk (**) indicates significance at the 5% level.  Triple 
asterisk (***) indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Figure 1: Outcomes from Adopting Subsidized Insurance. 
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Figure 2. Comparison of Historical Forage Yield Production Between County and Farm 
(1978 – 2015) 
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Figure 3. Average Historical Monthly Precipitation by Farm Location 
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Figure 4: Gudmundsen Sandhills Laboratory Expected Returns versus Variance for 
Varying Insurance Scenarios   
 
Figure 5: Barta Brothers Ranch Expected Returns versus Variance for Varying Insurance 
Scenarios  
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